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Tautological notion of the certainty of fact is one the self-evident fundamentals or ontological prejudices whose revision, according to phenomenological tradition, constitutes the true aim of philosophy. However, properly philosophical -phenomenological -analytics of the 'naïveté of positing' outlined by Hans-Georg Gadamer in the 'Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century' [Gadamer, 2008: 119] do not represent the one and the only possible approach to the fact; studies of ontological prejudices do not belong exclusively to philosophy but to the history of science as well. We have obviously gone a long way since the time when the university colleagues of Thomas Kuhn, who believed subconsciously in metaphysical realism, doubted the very possibility of the 'history of fact'. Kuhn himself in his foreword to the 'Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact' by Lüdwig Fleck referred to his friends' skepticism with irony [Kuhn, 1981: VIII] . A new scholarly tradition has already emerged; it uses the genesis of fact as a means of historical relativization of the foundations of Modern science in the spirit of Kuhn or Lorraine Daston [Daston; Galison, 2007] . Thus, Barbara Shapiro in her well-known book [Shapiro, 2003] presented a parallel study of the category of fact and the principle of factual authenticity in historiography and in the natural science of the 16 th century, while the work by Mary Poovey [Poovey, 1998] showed the genesis of modern fact as an indicator of the transformation of the techniques of power, on the one hand, and as an effect of the assimilation of Tacitean 'plain' language in the writings by the English mercantilists, on the other. Yet in other respects the notion of fact remains a true promise land: the sheer range of the concepts of fact developed in the Early Modern period (factum as a transcendental, factum as res gestae, the matter of fact as term of literary theory) turns the study of this category seen in wide context of genres and disciplines and on the basis of various sources into one of the most urgent topics of research. I find exegetic literature to be a fruitful source for analysis -for in the Early Modern period in general, and especially during the period that is of great interest here, in 1680-1740s, Biblical commentary became an exceptionally fertile territory of interaction of different disciplines, and in the same time -a laboratory which produced new theoretical languages and conceptual frameworks. Another, no less promising task, is the study of the political implications of fact: in the period when the question of certainty was seen as central for science and philosophy, and radical reform of political reasoning was the order of the day (projects of scientia civilis and mahtesis politica, the emergence of statistics, 'political architectonics' and jus publicum universale), epistemological innovations could not but have consequences for political theory even against the will of those thinkers who initiated the innovations (the obvious example here is the political career of the Cartesian category of prejudice).
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In order to achieve these desiderata I will study one of the important -although not always noticeable -power lines of the intellectual world of the Early Modern Europe, bridging the gaps between the two great 'new sciences': Newtonian mathematized natural science (new science) and scienza nuova of G. Vico. First of all, I will analyze the correlation between the notion of fact that came out of the inductive science and the hermeneutical category of factuality in the works by 'Newtonian' thinkers, Thomas Burnet and William Whiston. Such study will help to view the interaction of the fact as ontological category, the object of experimental science, and the fact as a narrative construction, an element of the theory of esthetics in the field of the commentaries to the Book of Genesis 3 . I will also study the way this syncretic construction of fact as formed at the intersection of the sciences of nature, Biblical hermeneutics and esthetics was assimilated by an Irish philosopher John Toland, a deist, an advocate of toleration and the equality of sexes, and, at the same time, also a Newtonian, and how this construction was turned into the basis of his sociology and political theory. Finally, I will turn to the opposite geographical end of Europe, to Italy, and will look into the writings by an author who, it has been thought, was not familiar with travesty philosophy by Toland -Giambattista Vico.
Justification for this risky rapprochement is to be found in the specific of the communicative world of the early Modern Republic of letters: the space was so condensed that allowed the rise of the most intricate discoursive formations and syncretisms that did not depend either on immediate influences or borrowings, or on customary limitations set by genre and discipline, or on declared adherence to a philosophical school. It is exactly the reason why I allow myself to disagree with such authoritative Vichian scholar as Donald Philipp Verene who has argued in his monograph 'Vico's Science of Imagination' that "none of the questions of Vico's science can be answered in terms of the thought of 'hardheaded facts'" [Verene, 1991: 144] . I think that, in fact, a substantial number of obscure places in the 'Vichian 'new science' could be clarified through the references to the author who turned the thesis of the 'obstinate facts' 4 into a motto of his science and philosophy -namely, to the above-mentioned John Toland.
A classic of the history of the early Modern science, Arnaldo Momigliano expressed his doubts that Vico had known the works by Toland but still thought it appropriate to place the writings by the Neapolitan philosopher into the context of European polemics against English and Dutch deists [Momigliano, 1966: 156 ]. Momigliano's intuition has recently been confirmed 3 Bacon, traditionally considered as a founder of experimental science, in LXV aphorism of his Novum Organum obviously rejected the basic principles of mosaic philosophy: 'For nothing is so mischievous as the apotheosis of error; and it is a very plague of the understanding for vanity to become the object of veneration. Yet in this vanity some of the moderns have with extreme levity indulged so far as to attempt to found a system of natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis, on the book of Job, and other parts of the sacred writings, seeking for the dead among the living; which also makes the inhibition and repression of it the more important, because from this unwholesome mixture of things human and divine there arises not only a fantastic philosophy but also a heretical religion. Very meet it is therefore that we be sober-minded, and give to faith that only which is faith's' [Bacon, 1999: 106] . 4 [Struever, 2009: 50] . This opposition to the trend that was growing in importance during the period in focus, acquired particular forms in the works by both authors. can be given to the contrary' [Whiston, 1737: 95] . Paradoxically the same thesis is to be found in the work by Burnet, in the pamphlet An Answer to the Exceptions made against the Theory of the Earth: 'The Rule we go by, and I think all good Interpreters, is this, that we are not to leave the literal Sense, unless there be a Necessity from the Subject-Matter' [Burnet, 1722: 27] . The misunderstanding should not be blamed on the author of the Sacred history of the earth but rather on a deist Charles Blount, the author of a foreword to one of its editions, and to another publication, The Oracles of Reason (1692) that contained ex integro two chapters from the Philosophical Archaeology, another well-known treatise by Burnet [Force, 1985: 39] . It was this contextualization of Burnet's writings that is thought to provoke negative reaction of his critics;
however, even if one admits that Burnet's exegetic principles did not differ greatly from those of Newtonian literalists, his story of the origin of the world was still in evident contradiction to Manner or Existence, is more exempted from its Disquisitions, than the ordinary Phenomena of Nature' 9 . The project of rational hermeneutics, i.e., the way of textual interpretation that was based on reason as the ultimate authority of interpretation (norma expositionis), was very popular among the Cartesians, both on the continent, and in England: it would be enough to name Lodewijk Meyer, Élie Saurin, and Jean Leclerc [Popkin, 1982: 70] .
Another central epistemological principle, the difference between nominal and real essences, was taken by Toland once more out of a work by Locke, namely, his Essay Concerning Human Understanding [Wigelsworth, 2003] . According to this principle science could only be concerned with names: real essences that made things what they were could not be known by us.
The knowledge of real essences of things was not only impossible it was also useless: it was Vichian filosofìa dell'autorità and Toland's concept of the authorization of facts reveal striking structural similarity. Rational perception of the universe of human things, corpi opachi dei fatti, or else, making certain human arbitrariness 10 (a reader should be reminded that in a letter the Neapolitan philosopher defined his science as the 'most certain critics of human arbitrariness') after Vico, and the certain study of the universe of natural and historical matter of facts after Toland equally require the mediating procedure of authorization. Vico defined authority as 'free use of will' that served to curb corporal movements 11 ; it was the use of authority that put in action the mechanism of conatus 12 . I will not go into the detailed analysis of the relation of Vichian conato to Epicurean physics (παρέγκλισις or clinamen of Lucretius) or
Newtonian mechanics; what is important here is, first, that authorization is defined by Vico as free action at the time of indeterminacy (it is the reason why authority is set in opposition to intellect), and second, that this action results in fact. The concept of fact is explicitly placed into the context of Baconian epistemology; Vico referred directly to the Cogitata visa by Bacon.
According to Vico, the truths of the world of nations seen as ideas -set out in 'philosophical' axioms I -XIV of the New science and called by a Baconian term 'hypothesis' -should then be seen in facts (axioms XV-XXII) 13 . Facts clearly form a substrata of Vichian philology 14 ; and the perception of the universe of facts is one of regulative principles of the 'new science' 15 . But are 10 'And with reference to the things of the most obscure antiquity of the nations it reduces to certitude the human will, which is by its nature most uncertain, as noted in the Axioms. Which is as much as to say that it reduces philology to the form of a science' [Vico, 1948: 110] . 11 'This authority is the free use of the will, the intellect on the other hand being a passive power subject to truth. For from the first point of all human things, men began to exercise the freedom of the human will to hold in check the motions of the body, either to subdue them entirely or to give them better direction (this being the impulse proper to free agents, as we have said above in the Method)' [Vico, 1948: 109] . 12 'But to endow bodies with impulse amounts to giving them freedom to regulate their motions, whereas all bodies are by nature necessary agents. And what the theorists of mechanics call powers, forces, impulses, are insensible motions of bodies, by which they approach their centers of gravity, as ancient mechanics had it, or depart from their centers of motion, as modern mechanics has it' [Vico, 1948: 114] . 13 'The last propositions, from the fifteenth to the twenty-second, will give us the basis of certitude. By their use we shall be able to see in fact this world of nations which we have studied in idea, following the method of philosophizing made most certain by Francis Bacon, Lord of Verulam, but carrying it over from the things of nature, on which he composed his book Cogitata [et] visa, to the civil affairs of mankind' [Vico, 1948: 60 -61 ]. 14 Cf. X Axiom. 15 Cf. the famous passage, transferred from the second book of De Constantia jurisprudentis to the fourth book of the New Science: 'To sum up, a man is properly only mind, body and speech, and speech stands as it were midway between mind and body. Hence the certitude of law began in mute times with the body. Then when the so-called articulate languages were invented, it passed to certain ideas or verbal formulae. And finally, when our human reason was fully developed, it reached its end in the truth of ideas concerning justice, determined by reason from the detailed circumstances of the facts. This is a formula devoid of any particular form, called by the learned Varro formula naturae, which, like light, of itself informs in all the minutest details of 11 fact and authority linked in Vichian philosophy? Is it possible to refer to the 'authorization of facts' in connection to Vico? It seems that in both cases the answer is 'yes'. As it has already been said, facts were the subject of philology that was defined by Vico as the science of everything that depends on human will. In another place Vico said that the philosophy of authority 'reduces philology to the form of a science'. How did it happen? Firstly, authority -the [Toland, 1696: 40] .
Authorization of facts is a way of actualizing underlying possibilities: divine ideas in Vico's case or natural/historical truths in Toland's. Stephan Otto, following in Nicola Badaloni's footsteps, praises Vico for having introduced a "regulative modal idea" into the modern inquiry -a novelty of far-reaching importance, surprisingly overlooked by the majority of Vichian scholars [Otto, 1992: 131 -132] . However not all Vichian scholars are so unreceptive to his 'modal rhetoric'. Nancy S. Struever in her monograph Rhetoric, Modality, Modernity (2009) described the main types of possible plots that had their prototypes in the Divine Mind and were exploited by Vichian rhetorical inquiry: legal fiction of Roman law, myths as 'archetypes of impersonal agency' [Struever, 2009: 53] , and etymologies in their ancient, original meaning of semantic potential of a word's root. As it has been shown by D. L. Marshall, already the early text by Vico -De antiquissima italorum sapientia -did not draw on demonstrative, necessitarian model of scientific knowledge but rather on rhetorical inquiry [Marshall, 2010: 115] . However Vico's mode towards this universe of possibility is rather contemplative; in this sense a place from the their surface the opaque bodies of the facts over which it is diffused, as we have fully indicated in the Elements' [Vico, 1948: 353] . 16 About one of the most representative examples of this epistemological strategy, the Vichian analysis of Publilius' law cf.: [Pompa, 1975: 148 -149] .
12 forth part of the first book of the New science seems to be quite typical; there Vico described the task of the 'new science' as contemplation of the series of possible events that had prototypes in the Divine Reason 17 . This contemplation of divine ideas was, for Vico, a theological transcription of the travels to adjacent worlds of political reasoning that had become fashionable thanks to Machiavelli.
Toland, on the contrary, viewed the universe of possibility from a radical activist position: possible plots should not constitute just an object of contemplation; they should be conceived and brought into being through the efforts of a philosopher. In the Letters to Serena [Toland, 1702: 16] . Vichian hermeneutics of human things that reveals the 'historical fact of Providence' to a contemplator is replaced here with the spontaneity of the generation of meanings: the design of Providence should not be revealed but created.
This interpretation of Toland's epistemology could seem arbitrary: for he declared in the Christianity not mysterious that true interpreter should 'acquaint themselves before hand with the Observation and Facts ... as Mr. NEWTON justly observes' [Toland, 1704: 177] . Seeming contradiction between inductive adherence to facts and the esthetics of originality is removed through theurgic acts of a genius who, in Toland's words, 'able and ready to assist Nature in her Pangs, and to help into the World those heroic Births and surprizing Discoveries, which would bring Mankind to a clearer knowledg of themselves and other things' 18 . Toland saw himself as this oracle of nature and called himself none other but the 'Divine of the Church of the First-
The mechanism of the authorization of facts based on the contamination of 'Newtonian' inductivist epistemology and the esthetics of genius was, for Toland, a necessary condition for the exposure of prejudices. In his famous first letter to Sophia-Charlotte of Prussia ('Serena') 17 'Thus the proper and consecutive proof here adduced will consist in comparing and reflecting whether our human mind, in the series of possibilities it is permitted to understand, and so far as it is permitted to do so, can conceive more or fewer or different causes than those from which issue the effects of this civil world. In doing this the reader will experience in his mortal body a divine pleasure as he contemplates in the divine ideas this world of nations in all the extent of its places, times and varieties' [Vico, 1948: 91 -92] . 18 Quoted in: [Daniel, 1984: 65] .
university. The course of life of an average man was presented as mechanic learning of the passwords of social integration necessary for survival in a society spoiled by prejudices but lacking any sense for him: for example, 'There is scarce any thing learnt at the University, but what a man must forget, if he would be understood, or not appear ridiculous and troublesome, when he comes into other Company' [Toland, 1704: 7 -8] . Notions and judgments accepted dogmatically would be naturalized at the end: 'so that not remembering when, or where, or how he came by many of his Notions, he's tempted to believe that they proceed form Nature it self' [Toland, 1720b: 144] . Way out of this communicative dead end offered by Toland could seem truly paradoxical: firstly (and evidently), one should 'authorize', i.e., check and appropriate the notions and judgments by others; secondly, one should develop the institute of public debates by all means 21 . Here Toland departed from 14 direction of the ingenium' and Spinoza's emendatio intellectus were turned into objects of criticism [Daniel, 1984: 156] . According to Toland, philosophy [Toland, 1761: 83] . The paradox is that in the Clidophorus, the second part of his Tetradymus, Toland formulated a 'two-fold doctrine' that implied the differentiation between exoteric and esoteric discourse that addresses a very narrow audience, the 'Club of freethinkers':
'The Philosophers therefore, and other well-wishers of mankind in most nations, were constrain'd by this holy tyranny to make use of 'a two-fold doctrine; the one Popular, accommodated to the PREJUDICES of the vulgar, and to the receiv'd CUSTOMS and RELIGIONS: the other Philosophical, conformable to the nature of things, and consequently to TRUTH; which, with doors fast shut and under all other precautions, they communicated onely to friends of known probity, prudence, and capacity. These they generally call'd the Exoteric and Esoteric, or the External and Internal Doctrines' [Toland, 1720a: 65 -66] .
In Clidophorus this differentiation acquired a strong historical and metaphysical foundation: according to Toland, the differentiation of the spheres of truth and opinion, paradigmatic for all Western philosophy, first found in the famous poem by Parmenides was nothing but the opposition of exoteric and esoteric discourse [Ibid., [69] [70] . Thus public sphere of debates was reduced to a esoteric company of the elect who spoke the language understood by the initiated only; elsewhere Toland called this company a pantheist sodality and even offered a fixed number of its members, justified numerologically (3 or 9, according to the number of Graces or Muses respectively). Paradoxically the break-up of communication described in the letter to Serena (on prejudices) as a result of socialization was reproduced here, although instead of various 'barbarous tongues' that could not be reduced to each other one deals now with just two types of discourse, esoteric and exoteric. [Toland, 1696: 180] . Paradoxical 'Newtonianism' of Toland set him aside from 'Romanist' Burnet who saw his cosmology, following Descartes, as a kind of hypothetical reasoning and was criticized for it by Whiston the Newtonian.
Together with high priest metaphors, exploited by Toland (let us remember: he called himself the 'Divine of the First-Born'), the elitist idea of a 'pantheistic sodality' and the differentiation between esoteric and exoteric language the idea of useful conversation based on an esthetic construction acquired a completely new outlook: one did not refer to the transformation of the mechanisms of socialization, enlightening or surmounting the barrier of communication but rather to replacing one kind of priestcraft by another, the sodality of worshipers of the God Nature. In was the membership in this club of freethinkers that Toland offered to 'Serena', his Royal correspondent.
The problem of esoteric language, mechanisms of socialization and ragion di Stato, -the 'Mysteries of state' to use a Toland's phrase, emerged in Vichian philosophy as well. However
Toland saw esoteric language as a result of the conspiracy of priests and politicians whereas Vico rejected this conspirological version: 'then, in order to give an explanation of some kind, they put forward one which is very offensive to Roman generosity, for they say that the rigors, the solemnities, the scruples, the verbal subtleties and finally the secrecy of the laws themselves were impostures on the part of the nobles (imposture de' nobili) in order to keep the laws in their 22 Quoted in: [Daniel, 1984: 121] . 23 [Toland, 1696: x-xi] . 25 Cf.: [Fouke, 2007] ; [Lund, 2012] .
16 own hands, for the reason that the laws make up a great part of civil power' [Vico, 1948: 315 -316] . In opposition to the Enlightenment model of historical process (shared by Toland, among others) that saw the contradiction between the clarity of legal language of the earliest epochs and its obscurity in the more enlightened periods as an insoluble aporia, Vico thought hermetism of legal language to be its normal function derived from social processes: laws correlate with the condition of a society. At the heroic stage of human history when the earliest laws 'were protected by mute languages' and were expressed in mysteries, the need to conceal the meaning of legal ceremonies and formulas from the profanes was motivated by the coarseness of human nature, which was unable to accept any other form of discourse. At the age of monarchies, i.e., the form of government that, in Vico's opinion, represented the climax of the evolution of political institutes, the emergence of the esoteric language of the 'reason of state' was connected to the divergence of the two branches of law: while civil equity (aequitas civilis) was destined for a small number of wise men who discussed the matters of state in the tranquility of their offices, the majority of people knew only their own rights in detail (aequitas naturalis) 26 . It is not difficult to find an echo of European debates on the reason of State (ragion di Stato) in these conclusions by Vico. It is interesting to note that for all difference in starting points both Vico 
